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THE CALIFORNIA POSSESSORY INTEREST TAX:
A TIME HONORED CONCEPT GETS A NEW TWIST
INTRODUCTION
In pursuit of its constitutional mandate that all property,
not specifically exempted, be taxed at its fair value, I Californiahas devloped a real property taxation scheme where
"possessory interests" in land and improvements are taxed.2
The interest subjected to taxation is the right to use or possess
the property or improvements, where such use or possession is
unaccompanied by the ownership of the land or the improve-
ments.3
The taxation scheme is important only where the underly-ing fee is tax exempt. Thus, publicly held federal or state lands
often generate these non-fee possessory interests which Califor-
nia has taxed since 1859.1 The historical difficulty in the appli-
cation of the tax has been the courts' inability to adequatelydefine the bounds of what constitutes a possessory interest in
publicly held real property.
This comment will trace the development of the taxable
possessory interest concept from its early beginnings through
the most recent cases and show that the California courts' dis-
1. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 1 provides in relevant part: "Unless otherwise providedby this Constitution or the laws of the United States: (a) All property is taxable and
. . . shall be taxed in proportion to its full value." See also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v.County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 779, 528 P.2d 56, 61, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448, 453 (1974).2. A possessory interest is generally created when a public owner of land orimprovements leases the land or improvements to a private party. The public owner
of the land might be the state, the federal government, a county, a municipality or alocal revenue district. The private party might be an individual or a corporation.
3. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 107 (West Supp. 1977). See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 18, § 21(a) (1975). California Revenue and Taxation Code § 104 classifies the rightto use or possess land as real property. The possessory interest as defined by § 107 falls
within the § 104 classification. The possessory interest's status as real property bringsit squarely within the article 13 constitutional mandate and thus subjects it to tax.4. See Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947); San Pedro, L.A.& S.L.R.R. v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 179 P. 393 (1919); People v. Shearer,30 Cal. 645 (1866); State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56 (1859); American Airlines, Inc. v. County
of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 3d 325, 135 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1976); Wells Nat'l Servs. Corp.
v. County of Santa Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1976); Mattson v.County of Contra Costa, 258 Cal. App. 2d, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1968); Hammond Lumber
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal. App. 235, 285 P. 896 (1930).
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dain for doctrinal rigidity has left the assessor free to expand
the application of the tax,5 limited only by his own imagina-
tion.' Finally, this comment will outline how the current ap-
proach to the tax has departed from the traditional concerns
which caused it to be implemented.'
EARLY CASES AND THE KAISER RULE
The Early Cases
California's earliest attempts to recognize taxable posses-
sory interests in publicly owned tax exempt land involved fed-
erally owned property located in California, and used by resi-
dents for mining and farming. While there was no doubt that
the federal land could not be taxed,8 it was unclear whether the
federal exemption was available to residents using the land.
The California Supreme Court confronted this issue in State v.
Moore.9 The court found the use held by the resident to be a
separate interest and therefore subject to taxation by the state.
The Moore court carefully distinguished the possessory interest
from the federally owned fee and in the process began defining
what constitutes a possessory interest sufficient to trigger the
tax:
The term "property in lands" is not confined to title
in fee, but is sufficiently comprehensive to include any
usufructuary interest, whether it be a leasehold or a mere
5. One possible explanation for recent expansion revolves around the tax on
possessory interests comprising a large source of revenue used to combat the rising
costs of enlarged governments. See K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXING CALIFORNIA
PROPERTY § 50, at 60 (1967), where the authors state:
Due to the fact that about half the land in California is in the public
domain, the taxation of possessory interests in this state is a significant
revenue item. In 1963, possessory interests in California amounted to 165
million dollars in assessed value and contributed about 13 million dollars
in tax revenue.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
6. For an ingenious attempt to create a possessory interest which failed, see
American Airlines, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 3d 325, 135 Cal. Rptr.
261 (1976) (no possessory interest in a nonexistent option period under a lease).
7. The confines of this comment do not permit any penetrating discussion of the
valuation of possessory interests. For the leading California Supreme Court case dis-
cussing the method of valuation, see De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45
Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955). See also Smith, Taxing Possession of Federal
Property, 4 SANTA CLARA LAW. 166 (1964).
8. The general rule of federal immunity from taxation by states evolved from
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819).
9. 12 Cal. 56 (1859).
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right of possession. Several persons may have, in the same
land, a property which is subject to taxation, and it is notperceived that the fact, that the property of the Govern-
ment is exempt from taxation, affects the right to tax theinterest which private individuals have acquired in the
same property. Exemption from taxation is a privilege of
the Government, not an incident of the property. 0
Moore's interest was a contractual mining claim, which
entitled him to exclusive use and enjoyment of the land for
mining purposes. The state singled out this "use and enjoy-
ment" as a distinct "property" interest and argued that, since
the state protected Moore's use and enjoyment of the property
against all the world but the true owner, Moore had to contrib-
ute his fair share to support the state, as would any property
owner. " I
Seven years after Moore, in People v. Shearer, 12 the su-preme court again recognized taxable possessory interests in
federally owned land. Shearer adversely possessed the federalland for farming purposes and in addition added valuable im-
provements to the land. In the court's view, Shearer's occu-
pancy, standing alone, generated a taxable interest. The court
recognized that the mere right to possess and use the land was
a "valuable species of property" often yielding large revenues,
and it isolated this right to possession as a valid object of state
taxation. 3
The rationale for taxing possessory interests in federally
owned land is equally applicable where the state owns the un-
derlying land. The California Supreme Court so held in San
Pedro, Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad v. City of LosAngeles."4 San Pedro was a lessee of certain tidelands located
10. Id. at 71.
11. Id.
12. 30 Cal. 645 (1866).
13. Id. at 656. The court's forceful statement on mere right to possession as a
recognized "valuable species of property" illustrated that any person who used thepublic lands for his benefit could have had a possessory interest. "The possession itself
of the public lands and the improvements thereon, whether by naked trespassers, orthose who claim in addition a right of pre-emption, as to everybody except the UnitedStates, have always in California, .... been regarded as valuable property interests."
Id. at 655.
Presently, the reasoning that mere right to possession can be a valuable propertyinterest continues to provide the underpinning for the taxation of possessory interests.See, e.g., Lucas v. County of Monterey, 65 Cal. App. 3d 947, 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. 707,
710 (1977).
14. 180 Cal. 18, 179 P. 393 (1919).
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in Los Angeles and belonging to the state. The leasehold was
characterized as a property interest owned by the lessee and
was considered fully taxable pursuant to the constitutional
mandate that all nonexempt property was subject to tax."5 The
court noted the normal procedure for assessing a leasehold in
real property, which provides for a single tax assessment to the
reversioner, based on the value of the leasehold plus the value
of the reversion."6 The court further noted that this normal
procedure proved unworkable when the reversion holder was
tax exempt, as the leasehold's value could not be taxed through
the assessment of the reversion. The court concluded that the
reversion holder's tax exempt status should not allow the lease-
hold to escape taxation and that the lessee should be separately
assessed and taxed on the value of the leasehold.'7
It can readily be seen how these early cases have provided
an important theoretical foundation for the extension of the
possessory interest tax. First, they have established the princi-
ple that California is not prevented from levying a real property
tax on persons in possession of real property, even though the
underlying real property is tax exempt. Second, they have il-
lustrated the willingness of California to both recognize multi-
ple interests in property and to treat the right to possess such
interests as valuable, taxable property. Finally, these cases
have supplied a general justification for taxing these multiple
interests in the same property; the fact that California recog-
15. Id. at 21, 179 P. at 394. The constitutional mandate that all nonexempt
property be taxed arises from article 13 of the California Constitution. See note 1
supra.
16. 180 Cal. at 22, 179 P. at 395. Ideally the lessee's share of this assessment
passes to him in the form of rent, set by the terms of the lease.
17. Id. at 23, 179 P. at 395. The court was unable to accept the premise that the
state intended to create a favored class of leaseholds which, since they could not be
assessed through the normal procedure, would not be assessed at all. Id.
The state, then, devised two assessment procedures when leasehold agreements
were entered into. First, when the lease involved two private parties, a single assess-
ment was made to the holder of the reversion. Second, when the lease agreements
involved a public body holding the reversion and a private party holding the leasehold,
a single assessment was made to the lessee based on the value of the leasehold. Ideally,
taxing one class of leaseholds directly involved no issue of discrimination. The lessee
who leases property from a private lessor paid no tax directly, but paid his share of
the tax indirectly through increased rent. The lessee who leases property from a public
lessor paid his share of the tax directly, but the public lessor, not subject to tax, could
rent at a lower figure.
An excellent discussion of the various procedures for taxing leaseholds appears in
Hammond Lumber Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal. App. 235, 285 P. 896 (1930)
(lease of public harbor lands by lumber company gave rise to taxable possessory inter-
est).
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nizes the interests and protects them from outside interfer-
ence." What these early cases did not do, was adequately de-
fine what types of possessions would trigger the tax. They left
open the question of exactly how many rights had to be con-
ferred upon the possessor to make his interest "property" and
thus taxable as a possessory interest.
The Kaiser Rule
Faced with this problem, the California Supreme Court, in
Kaiser Co. v. Reid, attempted to define what rights had to be
conferred upon the possessor of the public lands, in order for
the possession to create a taxable possessory interest.' 9
The Kaiser court outlined three essential elements for an
agreement with a public entity to rise to the level of "property"
taxable as a possessory interest. First, the agreement had to
confer use and possession for a determinable period, and pos-
session had to be reasonably certain to last for that period.
Second, the agreement had to confer use and possession which
was exclusive against "all the world," including the rightful
owner. Finally, the agreement had to confer use and possession
18. The strongest statement of the rationale underlying the justification for tax-
ing these mere rights to possession, which continues to be relied upon, appeared in
People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645 (1866). There the court described the interest being
subjected to tax and declared the rationale behind taxing it:
These possessions, then, are recognized as a species of property sub-
sisting in the hands of the citizen. It is not the land itself, nor the title to
the land . . . . It is not the preemption right, but is the possession and
valuable use of the land subsisting in the citizen. Why should it not
contribute its proper share, according to the value of the interest, . . . of
the taxes necessary to sustain the Government which recognizes and
protects it?
Id. at 657. Under this rationale then, the right to use and possess the public lands
derives its value from the state's willingness to permit its continuance and to safeguard
that use and possession for the individual. Since the state is responsible for assuring
the value of the interest, the individual should contribute his slice of taxes to sustain
the state. This justification has recently been relied upon as a rationale for levying a
possessory interest tax. See Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d 717, 96
Cal. Rptr. 379 (1971) (possessory interest upheld in public grazing lands).
19. 30 Cal. 2d 610, 184 P.2d 879 (1947). Kaiser represents the most recent at-
tempt of the supreme court to deal with a direct challenge to an assessor's characteriza-
tion of a property interest as "possessory." Subsequent cases have touched this issue
indirectly but they have primarily involved questions relating to the valuation of
possessory interests. See, e.g., El Tejon Cattle Co. v. County of San Diego, 64 Cal. 2d
428, 413 P.2d 146 (1966); De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546,
290 P.2d 544 (1955). Another major line of cases has involved the possible extension of
the possessory interest concept to tax exempt personal property. See, e.g., General
Dynamics Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 59, 330 P.2d 794 (1958).
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which generated a valuable private benefit, and this benefit in
Kaiser was the ability to earn a profit.
2
The agreement between Kaiser and the federal govern-
ment included provisions giving Kaiser rent free exclusive use
and possession of federally owned shipyards in Richmond, Cal-
ifornia."' The contract covered only the ship building activity
of Kaiser and was not transferable.
2
In reaching its conclusion that the agreement constituted
a taxable possessory interest, the court reaffirmed the histori-
cal reasoning that possession and use of the public lands by
private parties was a valuable species of property. 21 The court
reasoned that the exclusive use and possession of the govern-
ment property for a determinable period gave rise to the tradi-
tional type of taxable possessory interest. 4 Having rejected the
argument that because the lease could be terminated by the
government, Kaiser's right to use the land diminished to a
mere license, which could not be taxed as real property, the
court stated:
The test... 'whether an agreement for the use of real
estate is a license or a lease is whether the contract gives
exclusive possession of the premises against all the world,
including the owner, in which case it is a lease, or whether
it merely confers a privilege to occupy under the owner, in
20. The broad language of Kaiser, San Pedro, Shearer, and Moore seems to
suggest that mere use and possession of public lands creates a valuable species of
property subject to tax. In Kaiser, the shipyards were used to further a ship building
business. In San Pedro, the tidelands were used to further a railroad business. In
Shearer, the adverse possessors used the land for farming. In Moore, the land was used
to further a mining business. The particular facts of each case indicate that the uses
and possessions have business purposes. With the broad language of the cases in mind,
it is at least arguable that the "value" of a possessory interest lies in its ability to
produce a private monetary gain.
21. With respect to one of the shipyards, the federal government owned both the
fee and the facilities and Kaiser was assessed on its possessory interests in both the
land and the improvements. With respect to the other, the federal government owned
only the facilities and Kaiser was assessed only on its possessory interest in the im-
provements.
22. Kaiser's use of the shipyards provided it with a vehicle to make a profit
independent of whatever function it performed on behalf of the government. The court
noted that it was Kaiser's status as an independent contractor, as opposed to that of
a mere government agent, which led to the possessory interest tax. 30 Cal. 2d at 622,
184 P.2d at 886.
23. Id. at 618, 184 P.2d at 884. The court cited with approval the positions taken
in Shearer. See notes 13 & 18 supra.
24. 30 Cal. 2d at 618, 184 P.2d at 884.
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which case it is a license, and this is a question of law
arising out of the construction of the instrument.'25
The court reasoned that although the contracts gave Kai-
ser secure possession for a fixed period, subject to its compli-
ance with the terms of the lease, that was enough to give rise
to a taxable possessory interest." The court also noted that the
nontransferability of Kaiser's right to use the land and its ina-
bility to use the land for other non-shipbuilding commercial
purposes did not alter the quality of the possessory interest,
and hence did not affect its taxable status. 7
The function and utility of the factors laid out by the
Kaiser court are readily apparent. Both the need for a deter-
minable period of possession and the need for exclusive use and
possession against all the world, including the owner, serve to
help the court distinguish between those rights and duties that
arise as an appendage of an interest in land and those that arise
only from a contractual obligation. The distinction is impor-
tant because the tax attaches only to possessory interests in
land as opposed to contractual obligations, the res of which
happens to be land. Thus, the courts language distinguishing
a license from a lease becomes central to the assessors ability
to collect the tax.
Additionally, all three elements, the determinable period,
the exclusive use, and the valuable private benefit, help to
distinguish the possessory interest holder from the fee holder.
If these elements are present, particularly the valuable private
benefit, the court can be close to certain that the possessor is
not an agent of the fee holder and therefore, not exempt from
the tax.
The Erosion of the Kaiser Rule
The elemental approach of the Kaiser rule offered some
degree of structure and certainty in the application of the pos-
25. Id. at 619, 184 P.2d 885. The Kaiser court's formula for the lease-license
distinction originated in Von Goerlitz v. Turner, 65 Cal. App. 2d 425, 429, 150 P.2d
278, 280 (1944).
26. 30 Cal. 2d at 619, 184 P.2d at 885.
27. Id. at 624, 184 P.2d at 888. Terms in a lease agreement which restrict the use
of the premises will operate to lower the assessed value of the leasehold, but will not
operate to remove the leasehold from the status of a possessory interest. Similarly,
terms in the lease agreement providing for cancellation or for nontransferability will
operate only to lower the assessed value of the leasehold, but will not affect the status
of the leasehold as a possessory interest.
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sessory interest tax, but it similarly restricted a fluid applica-
tion of the tax. Rand Corp. v. County of Los Angeles" and
Mattson v. County of Contra Costa marked the first move-
ments away from the rigidity of the Kaiser rule.
Rand represented the appellate courts' first departure
from the elements previously found necessary in Kaiser to es-
tablish a taxable possessory interest.'" Rand, a nonprofit corpo-
ration, received a property tax assessment for its possessory
interests in tax exempt federally owned improvements.3
Rand's basic contention was that its status as a nonprofit
corporation should excuse it from tax on its possessory right.2
The court, however, found no need to link the private use of tax
exempt property to financial advancement.3 It reasoned that
28. 241 Cal. App. 2d 585, 50 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1966).
29. 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1968).
30. It might be argued that Tilden v. County of Orange, 89 Cal. App. 2d 586,
201 P.2d 86 (1949), had, previous to Rand, disposed of the requirement that the private
benefit, conferred upon the lessee by the lease agreement, be tied to financial gain in
order to create a taxable possessory interest. In Tilden, the possessory interest tax fell
on sublessees of tax exempt, publicly owned land who were merely using the land as
residences. However, the court noted that the tax should properly have been levied on
the lessor, who clearly procured financial gains by reason of his leases. Id. at 588, 201
P.2d at 87.
31. Rand's contract with the government also included a termination clause, but,
as in Kaiser, it operated only to adjust the value of the possessory interest; it did not
operate to remove it from the status of property taxable as a possessory interest. 241
Cal. App. 2d at 588, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
Rand's tax exempt improvements were located on taxable land and Rand argued
that this left it outside CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 107 (West Supp. 1976), which provides
in relevant part: "'Possessory interests' means the following: (a) Possession of, claim
to, or right to possession of land or improvements, except when coupled with ownership
of the land or improvements in the same person. (b) Taxable improvements on tax-
exempt land." The Rand court noted that a portion of the improvements taxed in
Kaiser were on privately owned land, see note 21 supra, but also stated that the Kaiser
court had not confronted this issue. The Rand court concluded, however, that the use
of tax exempt improvements was just as valuable on taxable land, as that same use
on tax exempt land, and this distinction would not defeat the theory underlying the
tax. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 592-93, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
32. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 590, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
33. Id. A further deviation from the Kaiser fact pattern occurred in McCaslin
v. De Camp, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967). McCaslin confirmed the
Rand position that profit need not be an element of the private benefit conferred by
the use and possession, and went one step further in finding that a nonbusiness use of
the tax exempt property could give rise to a taxable possessory interest.
McCaslin was an irrigation district employee who paid a monthly rental to reside,
at the behest of the district, in district owned housing on district owned tax exempt
land. McCaslin argued that he resided in the home as an agent of the district and thus
his tenancy was tax exempt. The court made short work of McCaslin's contentions. It
articulated the general principle that this type of lease arrangement, where the rever-
sion was exempt, allowed an assessment to be made directly to the party with the
1977] POSSESSORY INTEREST TAX
the underlying theory of Kaiser was that mere possession of the
public lands or improvements was a valuable species of prop-
erty and the holder of such a right to possession should contrib-
ute its fair share to sustain the government which protects it."
Once Rand's interest was viewed as property, it fell victim to
the constitutional mandate that all nonexempt property be
taxed."
The Rand court was consistent with Kaiser in insisting
that possession be secure for some determinable period in order
to give rise to a possessory interest." It was equally consistent
with Kaiser in insisting that the use and possession of the prop-
erty be exclusive against the whole world, including the
owner.37 Notably, however, Rand clearly expanded on the
Kaiser notion of what constituted a valuable private benefit.
The court allowed a valuable private benefit to arise from a use
of the public land or improvements that did not generate a
commercial profit. The Rand court enlarged the types of uses
and possessions that could give rise to a possessory interest to
include those uses and possessions which accomplish an impor-
tant private purpose."8
In Mattson,3  an appellate court again departed from a
strict application of the elements of Kaiser. Mattson had an
possessory right. The court then focused on the "residency" aspects of McCaslin's
tenancy as giving rise to a valuable private benefit apart from his employment. The
court concluded that the exclusive use and possession of the premises as a residence
was a sufficient private benefit to support the creation of a possessory interest, despite
the residency being a condition of employment. Id. at 17-18, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46.
34. 241 Cal. App. 2d at 592, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 702-03.
35. Id. at 593, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 703. The authority for taxing the possessory
interest in Rand and other California cases arises from its classification as property
and the constitutional duty to impose taxes on all nonexempt property. See notes 1 &3 supra; see also CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 201 (West 1970).
The Shearer court's characterization of "mere possession" as a "species of prop-
erty", see note 18 supra, and the adherence to that view by subsequent courts, could
potentially lead to- the classification of any interest in publicly owned property as
possessory - immediately taxable unless a specific exemption can be found. It should
be recognized that any expansion of the types of interests in publicly owned property
which can be classified as possessory produces a corresponding expansion in the tax
base for any particular taxing entity.
36. See note 31 supra.
37. Again, it cannot be overlooked that this exclusive use and possession does
not have to pertain to any use one might make of the leased property; the use and
possession need only be exclusive with respect to the valuable private benefit conferred
by the contract itself. See note 27 supra.
38. In the wake of the Rand and McCaslin decisions, one could argue that private
benefit means simply any advantageous use one can derive from the property. For a
discussion of McCaslin, see note 33 supra.
39. 258 Cal. App. 2d 205, 65 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1968).
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agreement with the city of Concord entitling him to operate a
refreshment service and clubhouse at a municipal golf course.
Mattson received a property tax assessment for its possessory
interest in the city owned land and improvements.
In rejecting Mattson's contention that he was a mere con-
cessionaire,41 the court reviewed the entire agreement, weighed
the rights conferred on Mattson by the agreement against the
essential elements needed to create a possessory interest, and
found the agreement created a possessory interest.42 The court
announced a concise new approach for testing whether rights
conferred by an agreement generated a possessory interest:
In arrangements of the general nature of the one be-
fore us, to which a unit of government is a party, almost
inevitably there are some features of relative durability,
independence, exclusiveness and fixedness, and others of
relative impermanence, subjection to control and public
participation. In each case, judgment must be made by
examination of the agreement in its entirety.4"
40. Id. The terms of the agreement gave Mattson the sole right to serve food and
beverages at the clubhouse for five years, with a right of first refusal to a new contract
for the same services for another five year period. The agreement called for the pay-
ment of 5% of the gross receipts from the operations to the city. The city required
Mattson to post a faithful performance surety bond and required him to carry liability
insurance to cover injuries occurring on the property. Mattson also had to keep the
premises in good repair and supply all the requisite items needed for the conduct of
the business.
The city reserved the right to terminate due to substandard performance, or upon
breach of any of the terms of the contract. The city also required that the quality
of service be on parity with neighboring restaurants. The city could discharge any
employee it found objectionable and if the city manager found any operation to be
detrimental it was to cease. Id. at 208-09, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48.
41. Id. at 207, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 647. The court was quick to note that the descrip-
tive words of the agreement calling Mattson a "concessionaire" and not a "lessee" did
not control the issue of whether Mattson did in fact possess a leasehold estate. Id.; see
text accompanying note 25 supra.
42. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 209, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 648. For the major features of the
agreement, see note 40 supra.
43. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 209, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 648. Durability under the Mattson
balancing test involves an examination of a factor Kaiser found critical, i.e., the secu-
rity of the possession for a determinable period. The Mattson court omitted any discus-
sion of fixedness, but that factor would arguably be present if the agreement was
viewed as sufficiently durable. Independence involves an examination of who controls
the enterprise operated by the individual on the public land. To give rise to a posses-
sory interest, the operation must be sufficiently autonomous to constitute more than
a mere agency, but the public body can retain numerous controls if the controls do
not operate to disadvantage the party in the conduct of his business. The independence
factor does not expand the list of elements necessary to create a possessory interest.
Implicit in the rationale behind the possessory interest from its inception was that it
was a "separate interest," independent of others' rights in the land. A use and posses-
1977] POSSESSORY INTEREST TAX
The court's generalized balancing process blurred the distinct
elements of Kaiser and in the process reduced the quantum of
rights required for the existence of a possessory interest.
The court found no need to translate the requirement that
use and possession be "exclusive" into a denial of Mattson's
possessory interest in the clubhouse area, despite the fact the
area was accessible to the general public." The court opined
that the freedom of the general public to enter the area did not
detract from the existence of Mattson's possessory interest,
because those who entered were potential patrons. The court
held that the entire agreement gave Mattson a substantial in-
terest, with sufficient exclusiveness of possession, even against
the city, to classify the interest conferred as possessory. '
Just as Rand had expanded the notion of what type of
private benefit was needed to give rise to a possessory interest,
Mattson expanded the types of uses and possessions that could
give rise to a possessory interest. The decision established that
"exclusive" possession could exist in spite of the fact that oth-
ers made use of the publicly owned land with the lessee, pro-
vided that the several uses were not mutually inconsistent. 6
The decision also established a new method of determining
what types of agreements created taxable possessory interests
sion of the public land subject to the total control of the public body would be incon-
sistent with the concept of what constitutes a possessory interest. See note 22 supra.
The Mattson court did not directly focus on whether the agreement conferred a valua-
ble private benefit. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 212, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 650. However, since
Mattson's possession and use of the land could potentially generate a profit, this would
concededly meet the Rand test-that the possessory interest accomplish an important
private purpose.
44. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 210, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 648-49.
45. Id. at 210, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 649. The Kaiser court set out a rigid distinction
between a lease and a license and this distinction proves crucial to the scheme of
possessory interest taxation. 30 Cal. 2d at 619, 184 P.2d at 885. The lease in Kaiser
required exclusive possession against the whole world, including the owner. Id.; see text
accompanying note 25 supra. A lease constitutes property capable of ownership and
thus will give rise to the possessory interest tax. A license does not constitute property
and will not give rise to a real property tax. See Roehm v. County of Orange, 32 Cal.
2d 280, 290, 196 P.2d 550, 556 (1948).
The Mattson court did not bind itself to the rigid Kaiser distinction between lease
and license. Under the Kaiser formula, public access to the dining area would have
defeated exclusiveness, which would have defeated the possessory interest tax. The
Mattson court shifted the focus of the exclusiveness requirement to whether the nonex-
clusive aspect of Mattson's possession converted Mattson's interest to something less
than "substantial." The Mattson court then concluded that the public access (the
nonexclusive aspect of the possession) enhanced Mattson's interest. Thus, the element
of exclusiveness was retained. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 210, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
46. See note 45 supra.
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in publicly held tax exempt land. The court would weigh the
rights conferred by the agreement against the essential ele-
ments needed to create a possessory interest and determine
whether or not the balance favored a possessory interest.
The balancing approach still involved a close look at the
three elements which Kaiser found essential for an agreement
to give rise to a taxable possessory interest, with two of the
elements altered significantly by Rand and Mattson.47 The
agreement must still confer a reasonably secure use and posses-
sion for a determinable period; the use and possession must
still be exclusive, but only in so far as no other simultaneous
uses of the property detract substantially from the use con-
ferred by the agreement; and the use and possession must still
give rise to a valuable private benefit, which can be equated
with the accomplishment of an important private purpose.
Nevertheless, the overriding belief that the holder of a
valuable use and possession should contribute his fair share to
the state that recognizes and protects it," seemingly led the
courts in Rand and Mattson to quantify less precisely the inter-
ests held by the parties. In the process, the elements of Kaiser
were left less than distinctly intact.
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS V. ARCHER: A QUANTUM LEAP
In the aftermath of Mattson, the State Board of Equaliza-
tion introduced its guidelines to aid local tax assessors in deter-
mining precisely what types of uses and possessions of publicly
owned land and improvements constituted possessory inter-
ests.4" Construing these guidelines, the Third District Court of
Appeal decided Board of Supervisors v. Archer, 10 which demon-
strates the current approach utilized in determining when use
47. See notes 43 & 45 supra.
48. See 258 Cal. App. 2d at 212, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
49. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §§ 21-22 (1975). The administrative code essen-
tially adopts the California tax code definition of possessory interests but also sets out
a subclass of "taxable possessory interests" which are "possessory interests in
nontaxable publicly owned real property." See id. § 21 (emphasis added). The code
also adopts the Mattson balancing approach for testing whether the use and possession
conferred by an agreement is sufficiently durable, independent and exclusive so as to
give rise to a possessory interest. See id. In addition, the code adopts the Mattson
view that simultaneous uses of. land not mutually inconsistent can each be exclusive,
which allows many possessory interests to exist in the same public land, providing
a further extension of the tax base. See id.
50. 18 Cal. App. 3d 717, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1971).
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and possession of public lands gives rise to a taxable possessory
interest, and which represents a quantum leap from the posi-
tion of the court in Kaiser.
Typically, a court using the Archer approach will initially
describe the California constitutional and statutory scheme
mandating the taxation of all nonexempt property,5 and note
that the use and possession of the public lands in California has
always been regarded as a valuable species of property, the
holder of which should contribute his fair share of taxes to the
government which recognizes and protects that right to posses-
sion.52At this point the Archer and Kaiser approaches diverge.
While Kaiser would rigidly apply its three-prong test, Archer
examines the agreement conveying the rights in the public
land, weighing them against the elements of Kaiser and
Mattson to determine if the agreement on balance creates a
possessory interest.53 More often than not, if the court finds
that the agreement creates an interest in the publicly owned
property which gives rise to a valuable private benefit,54 the
balance will favor the existence of a possessory interest which
will be subjected to tax.5
In Archer specifically, the complaining parties held graz-
ing permits issued by the federal government on tax exempt
51. See note 35 supra.
52. See note 18 supra.
53. See notes 43 & 45 supra.
54. The agreement must create an interest in the publicly owned property or the
possessory interest tax will not fall. See American Airlines, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles, 65 Cal. App. 3d 325, 135 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1976); note 6 supra.
In American Airlines the airline had leased a terminal on publicly owned land at
Los Angeles International for a term of 28 years. The lease had no option for renewal
and the airline and the airport had come to no understanding about any renewal. With
18 years remaining on the lease the assessor sought to value the possessory interest held
by the airline under the lease on the basis of 25 years of remaining possession. 65 Cal.
App. 3d at 327, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63. The assessor based the valuation on a
"reasonably anticipated term of possession" under a theory that the airline and the
airport "would have to get together" out of necessity and agree on renewal. Id. at 329-
30, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 264. The court concluded that the airline had no possessory
interest in the premises beyond the length of its lease. The court refused to raise a hope
or expectation of future use into something "capable of private ownership," as real
property must be for purposes of taxation. Id. at 331-32, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 265-66. See
also CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 103 (West 1970).
55. See, e.g., Lucas v. County of Monterey, 65 Cal. App. 3d 947, 135 Cal. Rptr.
707 (1977); Wells Nat'l Servs. Corp. v. County of Santa Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579,
126 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1976); United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 123
Cal. Rptr. 548 (1975), af'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 452 (1977); Sea-Land Serv., Inc.
v. County of Alameda, 36 Cal. App. 3d 837, 112 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974). See generally
Dressler v. County of Alpine, 64 Cal. App. 3d 557, 134 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1976).
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federal land.5" The permit holders received property tax assess-
ments for their possessory interests in the government owned
grazing land. The permittees contended the grazing permits
were mere licenses and not property, and thus not taxable as
possessory interests.57 The court acknowledged that the permits
were temporary, revocable, and that multiple permits could
have been issued with respect to the same tract of land. 5 Not-
withstanding these features, the court concluded that the per-
mit holders received a valuable possession in the public lands
that materially aided them in their businesses. The court rea-
soned that these types of permit agreements with the federal
government conferred some or all of the elements Mattson
found crucial to the creation of a possessory interest and the
balance in this case favored the creation of a possessory inter-
est.59
Archer remains consistent with the previous cases by in-
sisting that possession be reasonably secure for a determinable
period, in order to give rise to a possessory interest. This ele-
ment of durability was readily satisfied, as the possession was
reasonably secure for the length of the permit. Further, the
permits were renewable upon application by the holder. Archer
is also consistent with the prior case law in requiring that the
56. The permits entitled the holder to pasture his cattle upon the government
land. Although temporary, they were renewable upon application by the permittees,
The permits were also revocable and multiple permits could be issued upon the same
land. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
57. Id. at 722, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
58. Id. at 725-26, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Although the court conceded that the
multiple permit feature generated the possibility that a glut of permits could have been
issued with respect to any one tract, it found the probability of this occurring extremely
remote. Id. at 725, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Presumably, however, if a greater number of
permits were issued with respect to any one tract, then the value of any individual's
posssessory interest in that tract would be lowered.
59. Id. The court additionally noted that the California Administrative Code
confirmed its conclusion that the permittees held taxable possessory interests. Id. at
726-27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
The court simply supplied the sections it viewed as relevant, without any reason-
ing as to how they aided in affirming the outcome of the case. The court quoted § 21(a)
which provided the code's definition of a possessory interest. The permit holders in
Archer met the terms of this section since they had use and possession of the property
without holding a fee simple or life estate in the property. The court then quoted §
21(a)(1), presumably to demonstrate that the grant of the permit conferred the essen-
tial type of use and possession required by the code. The permit holders in Archer met
the terms of this section since they had a durable and independent possession, with
the possible exception that the possession was not exclusive. But, the court then
quoted § 21(e)(2), presumably to demonstrate that the type of concurrent use the
permit holders made of the property did not destroy the requirement of exclusiveness.
See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 21 (1975).
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use and possession confer a valuable private benefit. This ele-
ment was readily satisfied as the possession enabled the party
to earn a potential profit, and thus allowed the party to accom-
plish an important private purpose.
Archer is equally consistent in demanding that the posses-
sion conferred be exclusive, and is aligned with the Mattson
position that multiple use of the property will not defeat the
exclusiveness requirement. Exclusiveness in Mattson, however,
involved multiple uses of the property that were not mutually
inconsistent, whereas the multiple uses in Archer, involving the
grazing of cattle upon the same tract of land, were detrimental
to one another and therefore, mutually inconsistent. To over-
come this, the Archer court shifted the focus of the "exclusive-
ness" element to whether the individual's possession, stand-
ing alone, could be viewed as valuable. Thus, the individual's
possession would be judged exclusive if it accomplished an
important private purpose and any other users of the same
land could not totally inhibit the individual from accomplish-
ing his important private purpose.'"
Archer, unlike Mattson, involved no elaborate attempt to
weigh the rights conferred by the agreement against the indi-
60. One case, which followed Archer, implied that the California Supreme Court
had recognized that multiple users, making similar uses of the same property, could
each have a taxable possessory interest in that property. Georgia Pac. Corp. v. County
of Mendicino, 340 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (motion for summary judgment),
on the merits, 357 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 515 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1974).
In Georgia Pacific the court was asked, on motion for summary judgment, to determine
whether several timber companies, each leasing tax exempt national forest lands for
use in their business, could have a taxable possessory interest in that land. The court
looked to the California Supreme Court opinion in El Tejon Cattle Co. v. County of
San Diego, 64 Cal. 2d 428, 413 P.2d 146, 50 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1966), as an important
precedent. The court in El Tejon was confronted with the question of how to value a
grazing leasehold, and the question of whether or not the lease gave rise to a possessory
interest was not contested. The Georgia Pacific court noted, however, that the supreme
court had analyzed the nature of the lessee's interest, and by upholding the assessor's
valuation, had necessarily concluded that the assessor's classification of the leasehold
as a possessory interest was valid. In that light, the court further noted that the lessee
in El Tejon was not the sole user of the land. 340 F. Supp. at 1066. The court concluded
that El Tejon would support the position that, "an interest in real property [was]
taxable as 'possessory' so long as the holder of the interest [was] protected from
interference by other users." Id. at 1067. The Georgia Pacific court properly stated that
its holding, as well as the holding in Archer, went beyond El Tejon, but it stated that
the cases were close enough so that the supreme court would probably follow Archer.
Id. The difference in the two classes of cases, however, can be viewed as crucial. El
Tejon, like Mattson, involved other users who did not conflict with the use the posses-
sory interest holders made of the property, whereas the use in Archer and Georgia
Pacific can be viewed as at least mutually detracting.
842 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
vidual elements necessary to create a possessory interest." The
major portion of the court's analysis was directed at whether
or not the agreement conferred upon the holder of the interest
a valuable use and possession. The Archer court's analysis in
that respect represents a quantum jump from the rigid three
part analysis used by the Kaiser court in determining whether
or not an agreement dealing with the public lands gave rise to
a taxable possessory interest.2 Archer merges that three part
analysis into a solitary focus on whether or not the possession
confers upon the holder of the interest a valuable private bene-
fit, or allows the party to accomplish an important private
purpose."6
POST ARCHER DEVELOPMENTS
The Archer court's analysis of when a possessory interest
existed in publicly owned land proved helpful in cases involv-
ing similar facts 4 and was readily adaptable to cases involving
multiple users of the same property.6 5
61. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
62. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
63. The rigid Kaiser analysis erected considerable barriers to agreements dealing
with the public lands giving rise to taxable possessory interests. The Archer analysis
was less demanding and, far from providing barriers, it paved the way for a whole host
of agreements dealing with the public land which would give rise to taxable possessory
interests.
Archer seems to indicate that, if a party has the right to use or possess the public
lands for any significant period (which can be less than a year), and this right allows
the party to accomplish an important private purpose, that party has a taxable posses-
sory interst.
64. See Dressler v. County of Alpine, 64 Cal. App. 3d 557, 134 Cal. Rptr. 554
(1976) (permittees had possessory interest in public pasture land though permits had
value for less than one year).
65. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 36 Cal. App. 3d 837, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1974). Sea-Land had a 20 year preferential assignment agreement for the
use of publicly owned marine terminals. Pursuant to the agreement, Sea-Land had use
of the property only for the loading and unloading of vessels, the public had access over
the property, and the state could use the terminals for its vessels when Sea-Land was
not. The trial court concluded that Sea-Land had no possessory interest since the
agreement did not give Sea-Land exclusive possession of the property against the whole
world, including the owner.
The court of appeal disagreed, however, stating that the trial court's definition of
exclusiveness did not comport with Archer. It reasoned that Sea-Land had exclusive
possession of the property when it had a "business need", and that was all Archer
demanded. Id. at 842, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 117. The Sea-Land fact pattern clearly met
the Archer test of exclusiveness, since none of the multiple uses of the property con-
flicted. The state could not use the property when Sea-Land had a business use for it,
and the public access did not conflict with Sea-Land, even when Sea-Land used the
property. The court concluded that the agreement conferred upon Sea-Land a valuable
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More importantly, however, it had a significant impact on
three cases which represent the current extension of the con-
cept of taxable possessory interests.6 The three recent cases
further fix the courts' focus on the element of benefit-to the
near exclusion of all else.
United States v. County of Fresno
In United States v. County of Fresno,7 federal forest rang-
ers had agreements with the Forest Service allowing them to
reside in government owned housing on national forest land.
The rangers received a property tax assessment for their pos-
sessory interests in the tax exempt, federally owned residences.
The rangers contended that they resided in the homes as a
condition of their employment and thus, were mere agents of
the government, having no property interest which could be
subjected to tax."
On appeal, the court concluded the rangers agreements
gave rise to taxable possessory interests." The court stated that
a possessory interest usually involved the right of a private
use and possession of public property and thus, resulted in a taxable possessory inter-
est.
66. Lucas v. County of Monterey, 65 Cal. App. 3d 947, 135 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1977)
(involving boat berthing in a harbor); Wells Nat'l Servs. Corp. v. County of Santa
Clara, 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1976) (involving a hospital television
rental agreement); United States v. County of Fresno, 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 548 (1975), aff'd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 452 (1977) (involving residences of
federal rangers).
67. 50 Cal. App. 3d 633, 123 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1975), aff'd on other grounds, 429
U.S. 452 (1977). Initially, the Forest Service did not require its rangers to live in its
dwellings, although it reserved the right to require them to do so if it was subsequently
found necessary for the protection of the public or the natural resources. While living
in the dwelling unit, the rangers paid rent and utilities, they could not sub-lease or
assign the unit, and the Service could move them among the units so each unit was
used efficiently. If an emergency arose, the Service retained additional rights. It could
move additional employees into a unit or evict temporarily an employee and his family.
68. Id. at 638, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51. The agency argument has been urged
successfully. See Pacific Grove-Asilomar Operating Corp. v. County of Monterey, 43
Cal. App. 3d 675, 117 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1974). Pacific Grove, a nonprofit company,
managed state-owned conference grounds under an agreement with the state. The
court tested the rights conferred by the agreement against the elements Mattson found
necessary to give rise to a taxable possessory interest, and found that the balance
favored the creation of an agency. The court noted that Pacific Grove did not have
exclusive use of the property since the property was open to the general public. The
court further noted that Pacific Grove's management of the property was not indepen-
dent, but subject in every way to state control. Finally, the court concluded that
Pacific Grove derived no private benefit from its management of the public property.
Id. at 689-93, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 883-86.
69. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 639, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
individual or corporation to make use of government owned tax
exempt land or improvements and that that right gave rise to
a privately held property interest which the state could tax."0
The court acknowledged that not all agreements dealing with
publicly owned, tax exempt land resulted in taxable possessory
interests, and recognized that the agreement had to confer
upon the user a measure of exclusiveness. For an employment
agreement to result in a taxable possessory interest, the court
reasoned, the agreement had to provide the employee with
"something more than a means for accomplishing [an] em-
ployers' purposes." 7' In the court's opinion these agreements
provided the rangers with a residence, and the use of the public
property as a residence accomplished an independent private
purpose outside of the scope of employment, which was suffi-
ciently valuable to give the rangers taxable possessory inter-
ests.72
It is interesting to note that Fresno County, like Archer,
involved no elaborate attempt to balance the rights conferred
by the agreement against the factors necessary to create a pos-
sessory interest.7 3 Rather, the major portion of the court's anal-
ysis was directed at resolving the issue of whether or not the
agreement conferred a valuable private benefit upon the holder
of the interest. The practical effect of this type of focus was to
merge the rigid Kaiser analysis into a search for a valuable
private benefit.74 This shift in focus, seemed to cause the
70. Id. at 638, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
71. Id. at 638, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 550-51.
72. Id. at 639, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
73. If the rights conferred by the agreement in Fresno County were balanced
against the factors Mattson found necessary to give rise to a taxable possessory inter-
est, it is arguable that the balance would have favored the creation of a possessory
interest. The residence provided by the agreement conferred on the rangers a valuable
private benefit by way of a place to reside. The possession seemed reasonably secure
for a determinable period, since a ranger could have occupied a residence indefinitely
if the Service found no need to transfer him. The possession conferred by the agreement
also seemed to meet the Archer test of exclusiveness. The rangers had, at any given
time, exclusive use and possession of the property as a residence, though they might
be evicted for short periods in an emergency. The threat of emergency eviction could
have been analogized to the threat that a glut of permits might be issued with respect
to any tract of grazing land. Both would result in the lowering of the value of the
possessory interest but would not defeat its creation. See note 58 supra.
74. See note 55 and accompanying text supra. Fresno County underscored the
fact that the agreement need not pertain to a business use of the property in order for
it to confer upon an individual a valuable private benefit. The agreement need only
allow the party obtaining possession to accomplish an important private purpose in
order for it to satisfy the private benefit element in the possessory interest analysis.
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Fresno County court to reverse its reasoning process: first,
drawing the conclusion that the agreement conferred upon the
rangers a valuable private benefit and thus created a posses-
sory interest, and second, reasoning that the agreement was
sufficiently durable, independent, and exclusive to justify the
conclusion that the agreement gave rise to a possessory inter-
est. A sounder approach to answering the question of whether
or not the rights conferred upon an individual by an agreement
resulted in the creaton of a taxable possessory interest would
have: first, examined the agreement and balanced the rights
conferred by the agreement against the elements necessary to
create a possessory interest, and second, concluded whether the
agreement had or had not conferred enough of the required
elements to result in the creation of a taxable possessory inter-
est. In this latter approach, the question of whether or not the
agreement conferred a valuable private benefit would only be
one factor in the court's analysis of whether or or not the rights
conferred by the agreement resulted in a taxable possessory
interest, and not the overriding factor in the court's conclusion.
Fresno County is also important because it raises and/or
resolves a number of issues surrounding the application of the
tax other than the issue of what constitutes a possessory inter-
est.
In Fresno County, the rangers also charged that the posses-
sory interest tax was a violation of the supremacy clause; an
unconstitutional attempt by the state to tax the federal govern-
ment.75 The court of appeal rejected this argument" and the
rangers appealed the issue to the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the California possessory interest tax was upheld
as not violative of the supremacy clause." The majority opinion
acknowledged the general rule that states could not impose
taxes on the federal government," but beyond that it noted a
more recent rule permitting the state to constitutionally levy
taxes on those who worked with the federal government, so long
75. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 552. See also U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2.
76. The court of appeal made short work of the supremacy clause argument by
noting that the tax was not levied against the federal government or its property, but
against the private citizen and his "separate" real property interest in the government
owned land and improvements. 50 Cal. App. 3d at 640, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 552. See also
text accompanying note 10 supra.
77. United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 464 (1977).
78. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819).
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as it was imposed equally on other parties similarly situated
within the state.79 The court concluded that, though the tax fell
solely on private citizens who worked for the Forest Service, it
was not discriminatory and thus not unconstitutional.'" The
court reasoned that, though the tax was only imposed on ren-
ters in the appellee counties if the owner of the property was
tax exempt, the tax did not discriminate in this respect since
the renters who rented from nonexempt property owners pre-
sumably paid their share of the tax through increased rent.
Against this background, the court said that the rangers were
no worse off than those who rented in the private sector."'
The real significance of the Supreme Court's decision in
Fresno County may lie in the issues raised by the dissenting
opinion." The dissent argued that the tax levied by California
discriminated against the federal rangers in at least two re-
spects and that the supremacy clause should have protected
them from that discrimination. 3
Initially, the dissent suggested the tax was discriminatory
because the rentals charged by the government were arrived at
by reference to the prevailing rates in the private sector. The
dissent argued that, since the private renters were picking up
their share of the tax in the form of higher rentals, the federal
rangers were paying the tax twice-the share in the rental
charge plus the possessory interest tax levied by the county. 4
In addition, the dissent suggested the tax was discrimina-
tory because it didn't apply, within California, to all residential
users of tax exempt property. In support of this point, the
dissent argued that the tax applied only to the residential users
of "publicly owned" tax exempt property and not the residen-
tial users of real property owned by other tax exempt organiza-
tions such as private hospitals, religious organizations, or pri-
vate schools. In light of this fact, the dissent maintained that
the only individuals who were in a similar position to the rang-
79. 429 U.S. at 462. See City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958);
United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958); United States v. City of
Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
80. 429 U.S. at 464.
81. Id. See note 17 supra.
82. Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter.
83. 429 U.S. at 469-70.
84. Id. at 469. Justice Stevens noted that this discriminating aspect could con-
ceivably be eliminated if the government went to the potentially burdensome expense
of revising its rent schedules. Id. at 470 n.5.
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ers were those state emloyees residing in state owned housing. 5
The distinction the dissent made between the tax treat-
ment of residential users of publicly owned tax exempt prop-
erty and that of residential users of privately owned tax exempt
property arguably creates discrimination on the state level with
respect to the possessory interest taxation scheme. Concep-
tually at least, the theory of the possessory interest would apply
to either publicly or privately owned tax exempt property. Ide-
ally, the residential users of property in either case are charged
lower rentals because the fee holder-lessor pays no tax. In addi-
tion, the residential users of the property in either case hold a
valuable separate property interest which the state recognizes
and protects. Theoretically then, one would not expect the fee
holders' exemption in either case to extend to the residential
user, whose possession would be separately valued and sub-
jected to tax. 6
Despite the conceptual similarity, the residential use of
privately owned tax exempt property has been held nontaxable
in California in the case of the housing of hospital personnel, 7
the housing of church personnel, 8 and the housing of married
students and faculty at a private university." These residential
uses of privately owned tax exempt property have been held to
fall within the welfare exemption provision outlined in the Cal-
ifornia Constitution." This exemption has been interpreted to
include any incidental use made of the privately owned tax
exempt property which can be viewed as furthering the pri-
mary use made of the privately owned tax exempt property.
If it is merely the status of the reversioner which gives rise
to a taxable possessory interest,9 ' the California possessory in-
terest taxation scheme could produce some incomprehensible
results as the following hypothetical indicates:
85. Id. at 471. Justice Stevens differentiated even these individuals from the
rangers since it was easier for state owners to adjust the rent schedule to compensate
for the impact of the tax. Id.
86. For the conceptual operation of the taxation scheme, see note 17 supra.
87. See Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221
P.2d 31 (1950).
88. See Serra Retreat v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 775, 221 P.2d 59
(1950).
89. See Church Divinity School v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496, 314
P.2d 209 (1957).
90. See CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 1c (current version at §§ 3, 4).
91. The California Administrative Code defines a taxable possessory interest as
one where the reversioner is a public body. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 21(b) (1975).
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(1) College student A attends college X which is located
on publicly owned land. A resides in a dormitory on the pub-
licly owned land of the school. A's residency might give rise to
a taxable possessory interest by virtue of his presence on pub-
licly owned tax exempt land.
(2) College student B attends college Y located on the
privately owned land of the school. B's residency cannot give
rise to a taxable possessory interest by virtue of his presence
on privately owned tax exempt land, since it is covered by the
welfare exemption."
Although Fresno County deals heavily with federal issues
and questions of supremacy, at its heart is the taxation of an
interest that has not traditionally been taxed-a single family
residence on tax exempt publicly held land.93 The aggressive-
ness of the assessor in pushing for taxation of previously un-
taxed interests, coupled with an increasing focus on the ele-
ment of private benefit, can lead only to the taxation of an ever
expanding number of possessory interests. 4
92. See also case cited note 89 supra. But see English v. County of Alameda, 70
Cal. App. 3d 226, 138 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1977) (no possessory interest generated by college
living quarters on tax-exempt public lands).
In English, the court focused on the use made of the property rather than the
nature of the owner. Thus, since dorm-living aided the student in pursuing his educa-
tion, public policy demanded that it be covered by the welfare exemption and spared
from tax. Id.
93. But see McCaslin v. De Camp, 248 Cal. App. 2d 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1967).
94. Compare K. EHRMAN & S. FLAVIN, TAXING CALIFORNIA PROPERTY § 50, at 61
(1967) with id. at 34 (Supp. 1976). The 1967 edition listed the more typical possessory
interests as:
1. Forest Service permits for residential and commercial purposes includ-
ing resorts and stores.
2. Industrial, commercial, and residential harbor leases.
3. Downtown garage leases.
4. Possession and use of residential properties on public property, inci-
dental to employment.
5. Airport permits, including parking and garage leases.
6. Grazing land permits.
7. Forest Service timber-cutting permits.
The 1976 supplement listed the more typical possessory interests as:
1. Forest Service permits: residential and commercial, including ski lifts,
resorts, stores and cabins.
2. Harbor leases: residential, commercial, and industrial.
3. Downtown auto parking leases.
4. Possession and use of residences owned by public agencies.
5. Employees housing on tax exempt land.
6. Airport permits, including parking and garage leases.
7. Grazing land permits.
8. Indian land leases.
9. The right to cut and remove standing timber on public lands.
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Wells National Services Corp. v. County of Santa Clara
In Wells National Services Corp. v. County of Santa
Clara,5 the plaintiff had an exclusive agreement to provide and
service rental televisions to patients in a county hospital."
Wells received a property tax assessment for its possessory in-
terest in the publicly owned hospital district land. Wells
argued that its agreement to provide televisions did not create
a leasehold estate and therefore, it held no real property that
was taxable as a possessory interest. Wells also argued that the
agreement did not confer a possessory interest upon it, since
the agreement failed to satisfy the requirement of exclusiveness
in two important respects: first, the agreement did not require
Wells to rent televisions to two sections of the hospital, which
had their own televisions; and second, even in areas where the
agreement permitted Wells to rent, the agreement allowed pri-
vate individuals to supply their own sets. 7
Despite these contentions, the court concluded that the
rental agreement gave rise to a taxable possessory interest. 8
Initially, the court rejected Wells' contention that because an
agreement did not confer a leasehold interest, it could not con-
fer a possessory interest. The court reasoned that the agree-
ment could give rise to a taxable possessory interest if it con-
ferred upon the holder of the interest something more than
mere agency status." The court found that under the terms of
the agreement Wells was more than a mere agent, as it had
totally independent control of the rental and service proce-
10. Gas, petroleum, or other hydrocarbon rights in public lands.
11. Unpatented mining claims.
12. The possession of public property at harbors, factories, airports, golf
courses, marinas, recreation areas, parks, stadiums, and government fa-
cilities.
13. Possession and use of government-owned fixed equipment.
14. Air rights over public lands or freeways.
95. 54 Cal. App. 3d 579, 126 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1976).
96. Under the terms of the contract, Wells had the exclusive right to provide
rental television receivers to the hospital patients. He also set the rental price, retained
title to all the equipment, and assumed the risk of any damage to its property. The
term of the contract was for six years and it contained no cancellation provision. Under
the terms of the contract, Wells rented only to certain sections of the hospital and in
the areas where Wells did rent, private individuals could bring their own televisions.
The district independently agreed with Wells to try to prevent private individuals from
bringing their own sets, whenever this was possible. Id. at 582-83, 126 Cal. Rptr. at
717.
97. Id. at 583-84, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 717-18.
98. Id. at 585, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
99. Id. at 583, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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dures.'0 The court next rejected the contention that the agree-
ment did not confer the type of exclusive possession necessary
to create a taxable possessory interest. In resolving this ques-
tion, the court first noted that Wells had the exclusive right to
provide rental televisons and an express agreement from the
hospital to shield Wells from substantial competition from pri-
vate individuals, who might bring their own sets. The court
concluded that these two features of the agreement combined
to give Wells the exclusiveness of possession required to give
rise to a possessory interest. The court further noted that even
if Wells faced substantial competition, from patients who
might bring their own sets, the exclusiveness of possession re-
quired to create a possessory interest would not be destroyed. 101
The court in Wells, as did the court in Archer, took the
position that the exclusive possession necessary to give rise to
a possessory interest was not destroyed by multiple uses of the
public land which were mutually inconsistent. Wells, unlike
Archer, involved an elaborate attempt by the court to balance
the rights conferred by the agreement against the factors neces-
sary to create the possessory interest102
The impact of Wells, lays in its extension of the possessory
interest rationale to a markedly different type of use of the
public lands. Under previous cases, the possessory interest
holder made significant use not only of the public land, but also
of the improvements on it in order to obtain the valuable pri-
vate benefit which gave rise to the taxable possessory interest.
In Wells, however, the possessory interest holder made only the
briefest possible use of the public land. More significant was
the fact that the ultimate use of the public land was made by
the hospital patient-the lessee of the television sets.
100. Id. at 585, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 719. The independence was manifested by
Wells' control over the fees charged, the billings, the collections, and the maintenance
of the television equipment. Id.
101. Id. at 584, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The court stated it was clear from other
cases that exclusive possession against the world was not required to create a posses-
sory interest. Rather, it found that shared possession, although a factor in reducing
valuation, did not affect the existence of a possessory interest. Id.; see, e.g., Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 36 Cal. App. 3d 837, 112 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1974); Board
of Supervisors v. Archer, 18 Cal. App. 3d 717, 96 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1971).
102. The durability requirement was readily satisfied in Wells by the six year
term of the agreement. Wells also had sufficient independence under the terms of the
agreement. See note 100 and accompanying text supra. Wells also had sufficient exclu-
siveness of possession. See note 101 and accompanying text supra. The requirement
that the agreement confer a valuable private benefit was readily satisfied by the fact
that it contributed to the growth and profit of the corporation's business.
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Wells supports the conclusion that extensive use of the
public lands will not be necessary in order for an agreement to
give rise to a taxable possessory interest. 03 Indeed, Wells can
be used to support the position that the use of public lands by
a lessee can give rise to a taxable possessory interest in the
lessor, even absent any use whatsoever by the lessor.
Lucas v. County of Monterey
In Lucas v. County of Monterey, "4 the plaintiff had an
agreement with a tax exempt harbor district which permitted
him to berth his boat in a designated slip.105 Lucas received a
property tax assessment for his possessory interest in the pub-
licly owned harbor area. Lucas contended that his interest in
the harbor lands was nonpossessory and thus nontaxable.' 6
After dealing with a number of related statutes, the court
concluded that the rights conferred on Lucas by the agreement
gave rise to a taxable possessory interest,07 because the interest
he held was a valuable possession-one that others had formed
a waiting list to secure.
The Lucas decision, like Archer, involved no elaborate at-
tempt to balance the rights conferred by agreement, against
the factors necessary to give rise to a possessory interest.' 5 The
103. The general ratonale behind the possessory interest tax scheme applies
easily to Wells. By virtue of an exclusive contract with a public body, Wells gained
the right to go on the public land and make money. This agreement generated a
valuable private benefit which the state recognized and protected, and thus, it should
have given rise to a tax. But the Wells court extended this general rationale to agree-
ments where the private benefit was not derived from the possessory interest holder's
use of the tax exempt land, but rather from third party use, and it was this latter use
of the public lands which allowed Wells to accomplish its important private purpose.
104. 65 Cal. App. 3d 947, 135 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1977).
105. Under the terms of the agreement, Lucas could not assign his slip without
the harbor district's permission, and if Lucas was absent, the district could reassign
the slip to another boat. The agreement was revocable by the district without notice,
but the understanding was that the district would not revoke the permit, so long as
the slip was being fully utilized.
The slip itself was an area outlined by a floating dock, which was affixed by pilings
to the harbor floor. Lucas was entitled to attach mooring lines to fixtures on the dock
and was able to use the dock space adjacent to his boat for storage. Lucas was also
entitled to use fresh water which was piped into the dock area and electrical power
which was connected to it. Id. at 949-50, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09.
106. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 107.4 (West Supp. 1977). The code section basi-
cally eliminated Lucas' type of slip arrangement from the class of taxable possessory
interests by defining it as "non-exclusive."
107. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 955-56, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
108. If the rights conferred by the agreement were balanced against the factors
necessary to create a taxable possessory interest, it is arguable that the agreement
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court simply reviewed the agreement to see if it conferred on
Lucas a valuable use and possession, and when it found that
it did, it concluded that Lucas had a possessory interest which
was subject to tax. The significance of Lucas is twofold. First,
it marks the ultimate failure to apply the rigid Kaiser rule and
second, it completes the courts evolutionary focus on private
benefit, to the point that renting a boat slip becomes a posses-
sory interest.
CONCLUSION
The concept of taxable possessory interests in California
developed from the concern of the state legislature that private
parties were making valuable use of federal lands with poten-
.tially no tax liability. The state's concern was directed primar-
ily at those who reaped monetary rewards from their posses-
sions, for fear that they would gain an inordinate advantage
over residents using private land who paid their full share of
property tax.
Broad statements in early court opinions had implied that
mere use and possession of public land generated a valuable
species of property which could be taxed, while application of
the tax was limited to parties who gained monetary benefit
from their use and possession.' 9 Later court opinions, however,
relied on these statements as the theoretical justification for
imposing a possessory interest tax on parties who gained no
monetary advantage from their use and possession. The Lucas
decision represents the present culmination of this viewpoint,
as indicated by the court's conclusion that an individual dock-
ing his boat in a public harbor had a valuable property interest
that could be subjected to tax.
Similarly, early California court decisions developed a
rigid analysis for testing whether or not an agreement gave rise
to a taxable possessory interest. II Although courts in California
have seemingly paid lip service to this analytical approach in
resolving whether or not an agreement created a taxable pos-
should have given rise to a taxable possessory interest. The agreement was suffficiently
durable, since the permit could have been renewed indefinitely if Lucas used the slip.
The agreement was exclusive, since Lucas had sole possession of his slip when he was
in the harbor. The agreement was sufficiently independent, since Lucas had full con-
trol over the use he made of the slip. Finally, the agreement conferred a valuable
private benefit, since it gave Lucas a location to berth his boat.
109. See note 20 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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sessory interest, the current approach simply focuses on
whether or not particular agreements generate a valuable pri-
vate benefit. In summary then, it at least seems arguable that
if the court finds that the agreement confers upon the interest
holder a valuable private benefit, it will find that the agree-
ment creates a taxable possessory interest.
Given this approach, it appears that anyone who uses pub-
lic lands pursuant to any type of agreement will have a taxable
possessory interest. Indeed, there appear to be only two ways
to escape the levy of the tax; either by successfully arguing that
one is an agent of a public body while using the land, or by
arguing that one's agreement with the public body gives rise to
no private benefit. It will be a clever advocate who can per-
suade the court that either of these arguments is true.
James C. Martin

